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Protecting the Rights of the
Requested Person in Extradition
Proceedings: An Argument for
a Humanitarian Exception
Leslie Anderson*

INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, international relations have dominated extradition law and
practice, with the rights of the requested person receiving very little consideration. 1 Adhering to this primacy of international relations in extradition, federal courts in the United States have affirmed the limited nature
of their inquiry in extradition proceedings 2 on the grounds that the U.S.
Constitution delegates foreign affairs powers to the executive and legislative branches. 3 This judicial deference is reinforced by the language of 18
U.S.C. § 3184 4 which codifies the judiciary's role in the extradition hearing. Section 3184 does not provide for the committing magistrate to inquire
into the legal processes and conditions of punishment awaiting the requested person should extradition obtain.
When requested persons have raised the issue of an anticipated violation of their rights by the requesting state, the courts have held the issue
to lie outside their jurisdiction and to be a matter for executive decision. s
Therefore any consideration of the post-extradition treatment awaiting the
requested person is theoretically undertaken by the State Department, the
agency charged by Congress with the final decision to issue or deny an
extradition warrant. 6
This article will first define the types of post-extradition treatment
which requested persons have raised as requiring judicial attention. It will
next survey judicial responses to these claims and then consider the scope
of executive review. The article concludes that the courts have exaggerated
the range of executive discretion to deny extradition. As extradition currently operates in the United States, there is the serious possibility that a
* Leslie Anderson is a member of the class of 1983, University of Michigan Law School.
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bona fide claim of unfair treatment would not receive adequate consideration by either the judicial or executive branch.

TYPES OF CLAIMS OF UNFAIR TREATMENT
Extradition treaties themselves often include certain exceptions to the
obligation of a signatory state to extradite based on the requested country's
belief that under specified conditions extradition would lead to unfair
treatment of the requested person by the requesting country. Where such
provisions exist, either the courts or the executive branch can apply them
to block extradition. 7 For example treaties may provide that if the statute
of limitations period has run in either the requesting or requested country
for the offense charged, the individual need not be extradited. 8 Treaties
sometimes preclude extradition for capital offenses or require a pledge
from the requesting country that the death penalty will not be used. 9 In
each of these examples the requested country has articulated in the treaty
its right in certain circumstances to impose upon the requesting country
its standards of fair procedure (in the case of statute of limitations) or
humane punishment (in the case of the death penalty).
These treaty exceptions fail to exhaust all conceivable instances of
unfair treatment which may await an extradited person. Requested persons in U.S. federal court proceedings have raised three types of unfair
treatment claims that lie outside the limited exceptions provided for in the
applicable extradition treaty. Requested persons have claimed the trial in
the requesting state will be or was unfair, 10 that the awaiting punishment
will be excessive or cruel, 11 and finally that the requesting country will
be unable or does not intend to protect the requested person from assassination attempts. 12 Thus far no federal court or magistrate has denied
extradition based on one of these extra-treaty claims, 13 which this article
shall designate as claims to a "humanitarian exception" to extradition. 14
A functioning humanitarian exception would permit the courts to deny
extradition when the requested person makes a convincing claim that the
requesting country either will not afford the relator a fair trial, based on
pre-extradition occurrences or on convincing evidence of likely post-extradition practice, or will impose fundamentally unfair or inhumane conditions of imprisonment. 15 Because the humanitarian exception, if applied
by the federal courts, would directly implicate another country's criminal
justice system, its use would have to be restricted to the most egregious
circumstances.
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JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO HUMANITARIAN
EXCEPTION CLAIMS
In the 1901 case of Neely v. Henkel 16 the Supreme Court upheld against
constitutional attack the precursor to Section 3184. 17 An American citizen
had charged that the statute violated the fifth amendment because it did
not secure for the accused, when surrendered to the requesting country,
all of the rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed to defendants in
U.S. criminal proceedings. 18 The Court rejected the challenge, holding that
U.S. Constitutional provisions "have no relation to crimes committed
without the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign
country." 19

Since Neely v. Henkel several requested persons have argued in habeas
corpus proceedings that their extradition would leave them facing a criminal procedure or punishment inimical to U.S. constitutional or international law standards. 20 The courts have continued to declare that such
concerns are outside the jurisdiction of the committing magistrate and of
the courts in habeas corpus proceedings. 2 1 However, in a 1960 case, Gallina
v. Fraser,22 the Second Circuit noted in dictum that, if faced with extreme
circumstances it might reevaluate this policy. In Gallina the relator had
been tried and convicted in absentia in Italy on armed robbery charges. If
extradited he would have been sent directly to prison. The relator, an
American citizen, argued that the trial in absentia violated his due process
rights. The district court, echoing Neely, asserted that a U.S. court could not
consider foreign procedural safeguards in an extradition hearing and found
Gallina to be extraditable. 23 The court of appeals affirmed but with the
following reservation:
[MN]e have discovered no case authorizing a federal court, in a habeas corpus
proceeding challenging extradition from the United States to a foreign nation, to inquire into the procedures which await the relator upon extradition.
...The authority that does exist points clearly to the proposition that the
conditions under which a fugitive is to be surrendered to a foreign country
are to be determined solely by the non-judicial branches of the government.
*

.

. We can imagine situations where the relator, upon extradition, would be subject to

procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require
re-examination of the principle. 24

The court did not indicate any constitutional or statutory justification
for a court or committing magistrate to consider humanitarian issues.
Moreover, it did not find Gallina's trial in absentia to be antipathetic to its
sense of decency because of the possibility that the State Department
would condition extradition upon Italy's promise of a new trial as it had
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done in the case of In re D'Amico. 25 The State Department in fact did request
a new trial upon extradition of Gallina. 26
Subsequent Second Circuit extradition cases have preserved the Gallina
dictum, but in none has the court held that any deficiency of procedure
awaiting the requested person shocked its sensibility sufficiently to deny
an extradition. In a 1974 case, United States ex rel Bloomfield v. Gengler, 27 relators
claimed that Canada's criminal justice system violated their due process
rights because it permitted an appellate court to reverse an acquittal and
convict without a new trial. The Second Circuit rejected the claim, noting
that relators had been permitted a full defense at the trial level and had
then left Canada with notice of the appellate procedure. The court in
dictum said that had relators been denied the opportunity to assert a
defense at the trial level such claim might fall within the Gallina caveat. 28
In In re Sindona, 29 a 1978 case, the accused, a former bank president
charged with the crime of "fraudulent bankruptcy," claimed that Italian
extremists had threatened his life and that Italy's government would be
unable to provide him with adequate protection were he extradited. He
also claimed that Italy would not afford him a fair trial. 30 The district court
for the Southern District of New York dismissed both these claims as
properly addressed to the executive branch. 31 The court reached these
determinations with Gallina in mind:
I conclude that Sindona has not made even a threshold showing that he
would be subjected to procedures in Italy which would be so violative of
human rights as to prevent extradition. 32
The court also responded generally to Sindona's complaints about the
threats to his life and the inability of Italy's embattled political system to
provide him with proper security and a fair trial. The court wrote that "the
Italian government is evidencing its intention and ability to keep the
criminal justice system functioning in a proper manner even under the
most difficult circumstances." 33 The court noted that this faith in Italian
institutions was consistent with articulated executive policy; the State
Department had earlier sent a letter to all United States Attorneys' offices
stating that the U.S. had normal diplomatic relations with Italy and that
all extant treaties were fully in force. 34 Thus while the district court
preserved the Gallina dictum in that it did consider whether Sindona's
claims to unfair treatment made a "threshold showing" that would require
further judicial investigation, its rejection of those claims had a component
of the traditional judicial deference to the executive insofar as it relied
upon the State Department letter.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding. 35 It supported the specifics of the lower court's response to Sin-
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dona's claim to a humanitarian exception and also rejected Sindona's argument that the Gallina dictum required the court to play an expanded role in
extradition hearings when humanitarian claims were raised:
Sindona counters that our decision in Gallinav. Fraserrequires the extraditing
magistrate to consider whether the circumstances awaiting a fugitive upon
extradition would be so egregious as to offend the court's "sense of decency."
We find no such rule in Gallina. That decision denied habeas corpus on the
strength of established authority holding that the federal courts may not
"inquire into the procedures which await the relator upon extradition." The
fact that Gallina also added the caveat that some situations were imaginable
in which a federal court might wish to reexamine the principle of exclusive
executive discretion falls well short of a command to do so here. In any event,
it is apparent that Judge Griesa [the committing judicial officer] thoroughly
examined the affadavits and exhibits relevant to Sindona's claim. If Gallina
alone may not have required this much, it follows a fortiori that there was no
36
obligation to hold an evidentiary hearing.
This passage cautions against reading Gallina too broadly. The court
reminds us that the Gallina holding itself was consistent with established
authority refusing to consider post-extradition treatment. The dictum
merely suggests that under extreme circumstances a committing magistrate
or a court in a habeas corpus proceeding may address a humanitarian
exception claim. 37 Sindona indicates, however, that a magistrate or court
has no obligation to address such a claim, and that the Gallina dictum has
not changed the court's role in extradition procedure in the Second Circuit.
Other circuits have been even less willing to address the issue of relators' rights. Both the Fifth Circuit and the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals have reasoned that the foreign affairs aspect of extradition precludes any judicial inquiry into the humanitarian claims of the requested
person.
Their view of their limited role is reinforced by a procedural consideration apparently ignored by the Gallina dictum: the limited review of the
magistrate's decision available to a requested person. Appeals are restricted
to petitions for writs of habeas corpus. As suggested by one court, this
review has traditionally been quite narrow: "Under existing law, such
review includes only (1) whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, (2)
whether the evidence showed a reasonable ground to believe the accused
guilty and (3) whether the offense was a treaty offense." 38 Yet, the same
court indicated that issues not within the scope of habeas corpus proceedings might still entail a constitutional case or controversy. 39 Unfortunately
the court did not elaborate on the nature of such constitutional cases or
controversies, or discuss by whom they were to be entertained.
Against this background, in the 1980 Fifth Circuit opinion of Escobedo v.
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United States, 40 relator attempted to raise a humanitarian exception claim.
The court held the issue of the claim's validity to lie outside its jurisdiction.
The extradition of several American citizens had been requested by Mexico for the attempted kidnapping of the Cuban consul to Mexico. Relators
claimed to fall within the political offense exception, 41 and also attempted
a defense on "humanitarian grounds," 42 arguing that they would be tortured and possibly killed in a Mexican prison. 43 The court found relators
not to fall within the treaty-created political offense exception. As to the
humanitarian exception, the court's response was to quote from Peroff v.
Hylton: 44 "the degree of risk to [Escobedo's] life from extradition is an issue
that properly falls within the exclusive purview of the executive
branch." 4
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has also stated its powerlessness to consider post-surrender treatment in the 1972 case of Holmes v.
Laird, 46 whose facts might have been expected to excite more judicial
soul-searching. Defendants were U.S. servicemen seeking a court injunction to prevent the military from surrendering them to West German
authorities to face charges of attempted rape and related offenses. 47 After
U.S. military officials had decided not to prosecute them, a West German
court, under a special NATO agreement, 48 tried, convicted and sentenced
the servicemen to three years in prison. After the trial the defendants left
Germany without authorization and returned to the United States where
they surrendered to military authorities. 49 Defendants claimed that the
German court had denied them certain procedural safeguards guaranteed
by the NATO agreement. 50 However, the U.S. court of appeals held that,
even if the German trial had violated Germany's treaty obligations, the
court nevertheless lacked the power to determine that such violations
relieved the United States of its obligation to surrender the men, and that
their surrender was constitutional. 51
The court based its holding on practical considerations as well as constitutional theory. The court argued that given both the allocation of the
foreign affairs power to the executive and the doctrine of separation of
powers, judicial inquiry into cases whose consequences affect international
relations was inappropriate. 52 The court held that Holmes was a case with
sufficient international overtones to preclude judicial inquiry. 53 The court
also held that the judiciary cannot dictate executive noncompliance with
a treaty by finding the other contracting party to be in violation of that
treaty or of a principle of international law. Even if the soldiers' charges
of German violations were meritorious, therefore, the court lacked the
authority to hold the treaty void on that basis. 54 More pragmatically, the
court noted that all the elements of the crime had been committed in
Germany and alluded to the difficulty and impropriety of a U.S. court's
reviewing German judicial procedure. 55
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While Holmes considered a procedure slightly different from the extradition process of 18 U.S.C. § 3184, its arguments against judicial intervention
would seem to apply even more strongly to the extradition process, and
therefore preclude judicial consideration of humanitarian exception
claims. In Holmes the court was presented with specific violations of articulated treaty rights by the requesting state. With a humanitarian exception claim in an extradition proceeding, the court frequently is faced with
little more than predictions of unfair treatment not violative of any specific
treaty. Given this lack of a substantive treaty violation, judicial intervention is even less warranted when a humanitarian exception claim is raised
in an extradition proceeding.
Holmes and Escobedo, and the dictum of Gallina v. Fraser delineate two very
different views of the possible scope of a federal court's participation in
extradition or extradition-like proceedings. Holmes and Escohedo view the
court's role as perfunctory. Once the court identifies an important foreign
affairs issue in the case, the doctrine of separation of powers controls and
the court should defer to the executive. The Gallina approach, in contrast,
recognizes the force of the separation of powers argument but does not
view that principle as a total bar to the court's ability to consider claims
raised by the requested person of violations of certain human rights. It
views a bona fide claim to an egregious violation of basic rights as a
competing factor that, if sufficiently shocking, could defeat the court's
usual deference to the executive.
Even the Fifth Circuit and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
which view the judiciary as prohibited from hearing a humanitarian exception claim, have shifted somewhat from Neely v. Henkel' s sweeping unconcern with the rights of people accused of committing "crimes ... without
the jurisdiction of the United States." 5 6 Modem federal courts that hold
themselves unable to evaluate the merits of a relator's claim to unfair
treatment or punishment do recognize the possibility of a bona fide
humanitarian claim. They refer the consideration of that claim to the
executive branch, in which they believe the discretion rests to bar extradition based on extra-treaty humanitarian considerations. 57 There are two
problems with the courts' analyses. First, the Secretary of State has no
procedural obligation to hear a humanitarian exception claim and second,
the Secretary of State, feeling constrained by its treaty obligation, is not
likely to exercise the discretion to deny extradition on extra-treaty
grounds.
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THE SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE REVIEW IN
EXTRADITION PROCEDURES
After an extradition hearing, the magistrate issues an order either certifying or denying extradition. 58 Review by petition for habeas corpus or an
action for a declaratory judgment is available to the requested person, but
the district and appellate courts must restrict their review to the same
questions of fact that were determined by the magistrate. 59
If the courts have found the person to be extraditable, records of the
hearing and any judicial review are sent to the State Department, which
makes the final decision whether or not to extradite. 60 The executive
branch is not required to grant the requested person an administrative
hearing, 61 nor is there any provision for judicial review of the executive
decision. 62
In 1977 Herbert J. Hansell, a State Department Legal Advisor, described
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the protections afforded requested persons subject to the U.S. extradition process. 63 Hansell stated
that
The United States does not negotiate extradition treaties with nations which
do not permit defendants a fair trial. The possibility of a fair trial, even
though the standards cannot be expected to match ours in every detail, is
always a factor taken into account in deciding whether to negotiate an
extradition treaty. In addition, since these treaties may remain in force for
many years, during which time the judicial system of the foreign country
may change, certain procedural safeguards are built into our extradition
treaties. Such treaties require that the state requesting extradition must
produce evidence of the crime sufficient to persuade a United States court
and the executive branch that the person whose extradition is requested
would also be held for trial in the United States had the alleged crime been
committed in this country.
Further our extradition treaties provide that extradition will not be granted
if the person sought has already had a trial or is undergoing trial in the United
States for the same act. 64
This State Department description of the safeguards built into the extradition process is noteworthy because treaty language is the only source cited
as affording protection to the requested person against an unfair trial. No
mention is made of the executive's ability to reach an extra-treaty determination not to extradite based on "executive discretion." The two protective principles mentioned by Hansell, the requirement of a probable cause
finding and the refusal to extradite if the requested person has been prosecuted for the same offense by the United States, would not provide the
sorts of protections offered by the humanitarian exception. Thus, despite

EXTRADITION FROM THE UNITED STATES

161

judicial conviction that the executive will consider extra-treaty
humanitarian considerations when reviewing extradition requests, current
State Department policy is still apparently in accord with a 1912 Department statement on the limited scope of executive discretion:
The discretion of the Secretary of State has in the practice of the Department
been considered as limited in certain directions.... It has been customary
for the secretary to confine himself to the facts of the case presented in the
record which has been certified to him by the committing magistrate.... In
the second place the discretion of the Secretary of State is limited by the
International obligation under our extradition treaties to surrender fugitive
criminals. . . , even ... citizens of this country, who come fairly within the
terms of such treaties. 65
At least one commentator 66 supports the argument that executive discretion in deciding whether or not to extradite must be exercised within
the bounds of the particular extradition treaty. 18 U.S.C. § 3186, the
provision authorizing the Secretary of State to surrender the fugitive,
states that the Secretary "may order the person committed... to be delivered
to any authorized agent of such foreign government." 67 This language was
construed by a federal court in 1875 to give the Secretary the discretion
not to surrender an accused whose extradition had been certified by a
magistrate. 68 Treaty obligations to extradite, however, are generally absolute, 69 and therefore the Secretary's function may really be "one of conducting a de novo examination of the case to determine whether the
requirements of the treaty have been met." 70 Between 1940 and 1961 the
executive failed to extradite only twice following certification by the
courts, and in both instances the treaty itself explicitly permitted the
denial. 71
Jhirad v. Ferrandina72 is a recent case in which the Secretary of State
denied an extradition certified by the court on the grounds of differing
treaty interpretation. Jhirad, former Advocate General of the Indian Navy,
was accused of embezzling from a Naval Prize Fund in India, and the
courts, after protracted litigation, found him to be extraditable. 73 Both the
courts and the Secretary of State rejected Jhirad's contention that he would
be subject to religious persecution. But the Secretary of State denied extradition on the grounds that the United States statute of limitations for the
offense had run, which permitted extradition to be denied under Article
5 of the treaty. 74 The Court of Appeals had concluded that Jhirad's constructive flight from India denied him access to the statute of limitations
defense; the Secretary of State concluded that the evidence of constructive
flight "was simply too fragile to grant extradition." 75 Thus the Secretary
of State differed with the courts over a legal conclusion based on the facts
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of the case and denied extradition on grounds equally available to the
courts. Denial of the extradition was not an exercise of executive discretion
but simply based on a differing treaty interpretation. Although there may
actually have been humanitarian grounds for denying extradition, the
State Department apparently felt constrained to search for a treaty violation to justify its denial.
Two historical examples further illustrate the limited scope-or at least
the limited exercise-of executive discretion. First in 1933 the courts certified the extradition to Germany of a Jew charged with fraud. 76 The State
Department, in a memorandum, wrote that the United States would not
be justified in denying the extradition of the relator on the basis of an
allegation of his projected inability to receive a fair trial. 77
Second, in 1940 a German national charged with embezzlement sought
to avoid extradition to England on the grounds that, as England and Germany were at war, he would be interned if acquitted and also that his
extradition would subject him to great danger from bombing raids. 78 "The
Department took the position that since a proper case for extradition under
the Treaty of 1931 between the United States and Great Britain had been
made out, the United States was obligated to surrender Strakosch [the
accused]." 79 The outcome of Strakosch's extradition was that he was
acquitted, interned and killed in a bombing raid. These cases indicate that
the judiciary's references to the existence of executive discretion to consider the protection of relators' rights may be founded upon an inaccurate
perception of the extent of that discretion.
It would, however, be misleading to suggest that the Secretary of State
is not concerned with the plight of the requested person and will not
exercise his influence, when appropriate, with requesting governments on
a relator's behalf. What this article questions is the executive's power to
deny an extradition on humanitarian principles, as various federal courts
have suggested it can do. A footnote to Sindona v. Grant described the State
Department's procedure for considering a requested person's claim of
"political persecution" by the requesting state. The procedure, which had
been articulated for the court in a letter from a State Department attorney,
was
(1) to bring to the attention of the requesting state the alleged danger; (2) to
request appropriate assurances from that state, and (3) to instruct our
Embassy in the requesting state, in the event that the fugitive is surrendered,
to follow the case and report to the Department of State. 80
This practice was exemplified when Venezuela requested the extradition
of its former president, Jimenez, who claimed that he would not receive
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a fair trial. The Venezuelan Ambassador to the U.S. wrote to then Secretary
of State Rusk denying these charges:
I am sure also that Your Excellency is fully aware that my Government
infficts no harm on prisoners such as had been resorted to in my country prior
to January 1958. 81
The letter also specifically promised "to protect the right of an accused to
full and effective defense," the right to counsel and to a speedy trial. 82
Following this diplomatic correspondence, the Secretary of State ordered
Jimenez's extradition. 83
Promises of a fair trial and decent prison treatment are more easily made
than kept however. For example, in 1934 Austria extradited to Italy a
smuggler accused of killing two customs officers, attaching the condition
that he not be subjected to the death penalty. 84 The Italian criminal court
refused to honor the promise of the executive branch, because
No limitation upon the application of the rule of law, even if derived from
international relationships, can be taken into consideration by the judge
unless it has been transmitted into a rule of municipal law. 85
Of course the particular concern expressed by the Italian court would not
be raised by an executive promise to live up to existing procedural safeguards, as was the case in Jimenez. Nevertheless, the case does effectively
demonstrate that the executive of the requesting country may be unable
to enforce a good faith promise or, alternatively, could make a promise
knowing that it would not be kept. For those cases in which relators' claims
to humanitarian considerations are greatest, it would be more appropriate
for the executive to be able to deny extradition altogether.

CONCLUSION
In contrast to the recent expansion of rights of the accused in U.S. criminal
law, rights of the requested person facing extradition from the United
States have remained quite limited. The courts have held, with the Gallina
dictum standing as the sole exception, that the doctrine of separation of
powers limits their inquiry in an extradition hearing to certain factual
determinations, as delineated by the particular extradition treaty in question and Section 3184. A claim to a humanitarian exception is reserved by
the courts for the executive.
If executive discretion to deny extradition is limited to interpretation of
extradition treaties, then the current extradition procedure does not pro-
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vide an adequate opportunity for the requested person to raise a defense
based on humanitarian grounds. There is no guarantee that there will be
an executive hearing, no clear standard of executive review, and there is
a limited range of humanitarian concerns that are expressed in extradition
treaties themselves. Finally there is no assurance that the executive, in its
concern to maintain foreign relations, will not sacrifice the interests of the
individual in order to achieve national ends. 86 By referring humanitarian
claims to the executive, federal courts recognize that certain rights do need
protection. Executive discretion would appear to be an inadequate vehicle
for the legitimate assertion of these rights.
Application of the humanitarian exception by federal courts in extradition proceedings would serve a useful function. The exception would block
extraditions that, if carried out, would subject the requested person to trial
or punishment that would shock the conscience of the court. Although
recent humanitarian claims by relators may not have warranted application
of the exception, 87 that does not invalidate the need for its incorporation
into extradition procedure. One can easily conceive of an appropriately
egregious factual setting: for example, an extradition request by a South
American government deemed a strategic link in U.S. defense policy but
whose prisons are notorious for their human rights violations. Surely it
would be more consistent with national notions of justice for the United
States to have an accepted principle by which to deny such an extradition.
Because the courts are the traditional protectors of individual rights in
the United States and because the courts would be less subject to external
political pressures in the rare instance in which the humanitarian exception
would be applicable, the courts should be able to apply the humanitarian
exception. 88 The Gallina dictum's standard of "shocking the sensibility of
the court" seems an apt one to trigger the exception. Yet, Gallina does not
state the basis of the court's expanded jurisdiction to determine the
humanitarian exception. While the focus of this article has been to identify
a need for rather than the implementation of the exception, the soundest
route to judicial access to the exception would be to write the exception
into the U.S. extradition statute or into extradition treaties themselves, as,
for example, Sweden regularly does. 89

NOTES
I See 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 323 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda ed. 1973).
2 See, e.g., Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F.Supp. 1195,1199 (D.D.C. 1979) ("[w]hile the judiciary
has been given a uniquely important role to play in the American extradition process, that
role is limited to the making of a determination or probable cause. The ultimate decision to
surrender the defendant lies with the executive branch, and any objection to the treatment
of an extradited party must be made through diplomatic channels. The very fact that extradi-
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tion is accomplished under treaty indicates that it is properly considered to be part of the
foreign affairs responsibility of the President").
3 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl.
11; art. II, § 2.
4 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976):
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evidence of criminality may be heard and considered. If, on such hearing, he deems
the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty
or convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken
before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition
of the proper authorities of such foreign government for the surrender of such person,
according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue his warrant
for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain until
such surrender shall be made.
5 See, e.g., Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1107 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Sindona,
450 F.Supp. 672, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir.

1980).
6 U.S.C. § 3186 (1976).
7 See, e.g., Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 513 (7th Cir. 1981).
8 See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 21, 1972, United States-Argentina, art. VII(c), 23
U.S.T. 3501, T.I.A.S. No. 7510.
9 See, e.g., Convention on Extradition, Oct. 24, 1961, United States-Sweden, art. VII, 14
U.S.T. 1845, T.I.A.S. 5496.
10 See, Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901) (accused, charged with embezzlement
of public funds, argued that his U.S. due process rights would not be protected by a Cuban
trial); United States ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1974) (relators,
accused of conspiracy to import hashish, charged that Canadian appellate procedure, which
permits the prosecutor to appeal in a criminal case, and the appellate court to reverse without
a new trial, violated due process rights); Gallina v. Fraser, 177 F.Supp. 856, 865 (D. Conn.
1959), aff'd 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960) (relator, charged with
armed robbery in Italy, argued that his trial and conviction in absentia violated his due process
rights to face his accuser and conduct a defense); In re Normano, 7 F.Supp. 329, 330 (D. Mass.
1934) (relator, a Jew requested by Germany on fraud charges, argued that Germany would
not afford a fair trial to a Jew).
11 Relators in Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098,1107 (5th Cir. 1980), charged with
attempted kidnapping and murder of Cuban Consul to Mexico, argued they would be
tortured in prison if surrendered to Mexico.
12 See, e.g., Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980) (political enemies in Italy
had called for relator's assassination).
13 Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d at 78 ("we have discovered no case authorizing a federal
court, in a habeas corpus proceeding challenging extradition from the United States to a
foreign nation, to inquire into the procedures which await the relator upon extradition"). But
Cf. Colvin v. State, 25 CRIM. L. REp. (BNA) 2399 (June 21, 1979), where a claim that the
requesting jurisdiction would not provide the accused with fair treatment succeeded in an
interstate, rather than an international, setting. The Maryland court, concluding that a man
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suspected of raping a juvenile was unlikely to recieve a fair trial in the requesting state of
Massachusetts, refused to certify his extradition. The Boston prosecutor had promised to add
another ten years to the sentence if the accused sought to fight extradition. The Massachusetts court also failed to supply the Maryland court with a specific date for the alleged offense.
Calling the prosecutor's behavior "monumental arrogance," the Maryland judge wrote:
This court finds as a fact that the petitioner faces prospective unconstitutional treatment if he is forced to return to Boston for trial. This court is "satisfied by substantial
and competent evidence that the feeling against the petitioner and the attitude of the
prosecuting and peace officers of the demanding state is such as to furnish reasonable
grounds for the belief that he will not receive a fair and impartial trial.
A constitutional right to a fair trial in the requesting State has not been recognized in
international extradition cases. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
14 The term "humanitarian grounds" is used in Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247,1249 (4th
Cir. 1976), cert.denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977), and in Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d at 1107.
Peroff, which held that it was the executive who had the discretion to deny an extradition on
such grounds, added that they "exist only when it appears that, if extradited, the individual
will be persecuted, not prosecuted, or subjected to grave injustice." Peroff, 542 F.2d at 1249.
Escobedo similarly referred the consideration of relators' humanitarian claims to the executive.
15 A humanitarian exception would present special problems of admissibility of evidence
and standards of proof, as the requested person making a claim to it would frequently be
seeking to demonstrate that systematic unfair treatment of others suggests that he would
likewise be treated unfairly. This issue is beyond the scope of this article. However, evidentiary problems did not stop the court from denying extradition in Colvin v. State. See supra note
13.
16 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
17 31 Stat. 656, c. 793 (June 6, 1900).
18 Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. at 122.
19 Id. at 122.
20 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
21 See supra note 5.
22 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
23 Gallina v. Fraser, 177 F.Supp. 856 (D. Conn. 1959).
24 Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d at 78-79 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
25 177 F.Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). D'Amico, like Gallina, had been tried and convicted
in absentia. Counsel for Italy represented ,to the district court that he would be tried anew if
extradited.
26 6 M. WHmrrAN, DIGE;ST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1120 (1968).
27 507 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974).
28 Id. at 928.
29 450 F.Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
30 Id. at 694.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 695. Sindona had argued that his situation should be analogized to that of a
refugee facing deportation. Any contracting state to the United Nations' Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, agrees not to return refugees to
any state where life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. Sindona, whose death had been
called for by leftist demonstrations in Italy, argued he was being prosecuted at least partially
on account of his political opinions. The district court rejected Sindona's refugee analogy,
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however, because the U.N. Convention by its own terms does not apply to refugees who have
committed a serious non-political offense prior to admission to the country of refuge.
33 In re Sindona, 450 F.Supp. at 695.
34 Id.
35 Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980). This is the most recent Second Circuit
opinion citing Gallina in which the humanitarian exception was raised.
36 Id. at 175 (citations omitted).
37 Sindona v. Grant's restatement of the Gallinadictum, like the dictum itself, fails to state
the source of the court's jurisdiction to decide a claim to a humanitarian exception. For a
discussion of possible sources of jurisdiction, see Note, Foreign Trials in Absentia: Due Process
Objections to UnconditionalExtradition, 13 STAN. L. Rav. 370-378 (1961). The note argues that in
order to deny extradition on due process grounds, the courts would have to find that the
extradition itself, not the procedure awaiting the requested person, denied due process. The

note concludes that judicial intervention to deny extradition should be available "when the
alternatives have been exhausted." Id. at 372 n.11.
38 Wacker v. Bisson, 348 F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1965).
39 Id. at 606.
40 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1980).
41 The political offense exception is commonly included in extradition treaties. Typically
it provides that extradition will be denied "when the offense is regarded by the requested
party as one of a political character or if the person sought proves that the request for his
extradition has, in fact, been made with a view to trying or punishing him for an offense of
a political character." Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 508. To determine whether or not an
otherwise extraditable crime falls within the political offense, the court must determine "that
there was a violent political disturbance in the requesting country at the time of the alleged
acts, and that the acts charged against the person whose extradition is sought were recognizably incidental to the disturbance." Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 516.
42 Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d at 1107.
43 Id.
44 Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
45 Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d at 1107 (citations omitted).
46 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
47 Id. at 1214.
48 Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of
Their Forces, June 19, 1951, [1953 pt. 2] 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846. The Treaty lists
safeguards to guarantee a fair trial approximating some but not all of the safeguards of the
United States Constitution; Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d at 1213.
49 Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d at 1214.
50 The servicemen argued that they were not granted a speedy trial, that they were denied
the counsel of their choice, that their German lawyer provided ineffective counsel because
of language difficulties, that they were denied the right to confront their accuser and another
witness, and finally that they were not provided with a verbatim transcript needed to bring
an appeal. 459 F.2d at 1214.
51 Id. at 1219-20.
52 Id. at 1215, citing Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959)
("the controlling considerations are the interacting interests of the United States and of
foreign countries, and in assessing them we must move with the circumspection appropriate
when [a court] is adjudicating issues inevitably entangled in the conduct of our international
relations"), and Mersiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-589 (1952) ("and undeniably,
matters initially and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the
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conduct of foreign relations ... are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of
government as to be largely immune from indirect inquiry or interference").
53 Holmes v. Laird, 859 F.2d at 1215-16.
54 Id. at 1219-22.
55 Id. at 1220.
56 180 U.S. at 122, Neely continues that the accused's American citizenship does not give
him "immunity to commit crime in other countries, nor entitle him to demand, of right, a
trial in any other mode than that allowed to its own people by the country whose laws he
has violated and from whose justice he has fled." Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. at 123.
57 See supra note 5.
58 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976).
59 The questions ordinarily determined by the initial hearer and reviewed by the court
considering the petition for habeas corpus or a declaratory judgment are: (1) did the magistrate have jurisdiction? (2) did the evidence establish reasonable grounds to believe the
accused guilty? and (3) was the offense a treaty offense? Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843 (1st
Cir. 1980).
60 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184, 3185 (1976); Eain v. Wilkes, 681 F.2d at 508.
61 See Peroff v. Hylton, 563 F.2d at 1102.
62 See Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d at 1105.
63 Administration Recommends Senate Approval of Genocide Convention, 76 DEP' ST. BuLL. 676, 679
(June 27, 1977).
64 Id.
65 Letter from Counselor of the Department of State Chandler P. Anderson to Secretary
of State Knox, Feb. 5,1912, reprintedin 6 M. W~mromAm, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 1027-1028
(1968). Anderson also states that the executive in review may find the proceedings irregular,
may differ on the weight or sufficiency of the evidence with the committing magistrate, or
may differ as to treaty construction. He concludes that "generally it seems that he [the
Secretary of State] may refuse extradition on grounds of public policy bearing upon international relations." Id. Anderson does not state whether or not this denial must fall within the
limits of executive review he has detailed.
66 Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1313 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Executive Discretion]:
Both the statute [18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184, 3186 (1976)] and the courts are silent as to
direct limits imposed on the secretary's discretion to refuse surrender. Usually the
treaty obligation to extradite is absolute ... T]he statute should probably be interpreted to grant the secretary only the limited discretion to differ from the courts in the
matter of treaty interpretation.
Id. at 1315-16.
67 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1976) (emphasis added).
68 In re Stupp. 23 F. Cas. 296, 302 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 13,563). In Stupp the Secretary
of State denied the extradition on the grounds that the treaty did not apply to an alleged
offense that occurred outside the territory of the requesting country. In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas.
281, 295 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 13,562).
69 Note, Executive Discretion, supra note 66, at 1315.
70 Id. at 1328.
71 Id.
72 362 F.Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), reu'd and remanded, 486 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1973), 401
F.Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), 536 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976).
73 Id.
74 E. McDowELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 114-16 (1976).
75 Id. at 115.
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76 In re Normano, 7 F.Supp. 329 (D. Mass. 1934). "The attorneys for Normano urge as
grounds for granting the petition the reports respecting the treatment accorded Jews under
the present regime in Germany, of which it is argued this court may well take judicial notice.
Such considerations ought not to influence the decision. Whatever may be the situation in
Germany, the Extradition Treaty between that government and the United States is still in
full force, and it is the duty of the court to uphold and respect it just as it is bound to uphold
the laws and Constitution of the United States." Id. at 330-31.
77 Memorandum from Joseph R. Baker of the Legal Advisor's Office of the Department
of State, April 4, 1933, reprinted in part in 4 G. HAcKwoRTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §
339 at 202 (1942). See also Note, Executive Discretion, supra note 66, at 1325. Fortunately, Normano
ultimately was not extradited. In March, 1933, the State Department met with the German
ambassador to the United States to ask that the extradition request be withdrawn. Germany
refused, but Normano's July 3 Application for Discharge was granted because Germany had
failed to deliver the extradition warrant to the marshall holding Normano within the statutory two month period. In re Normano, 7 F.Supp. at 330.
78 See 6 M. WHrnmAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 888-89 (1968).
79 Id. at 888.
80 Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167,174 n.10 (2d Cir. 1980); see generally, M. WmnmAN, supra
note 78, at 1051-53 (discusses conditions attached to surrender).
81 49 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 365-67 (1963).
82 Id. at 366.
83 Id. at 364.
84 See S. BEDI, EXTADImON IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 195 (1966).
85 Id.
86 See Wise, Some Problems of Extradition, 15 WAYNE L. Rav. 709, 722-23 (1969). The author
criticizes the current extradition procedure in which questions of unfair treatment are held
to be outside judicial consideration: "Such questions of justice are even less suitable for
consideration by executive departments, which are commonly influenced by a fear of offending some fairly dispicable regimes." Id.
87 See supra notes 16-57, and accompanying text.
88 See I. SHEARER, EXTRADmON Im INTERNATIONAL LAW, 197 (1971). The author supports
increased judicial participation in the extradition procedure generally. He writes that
[w]hether the requested State chooses to deal with extradition matters entirely at the
executive level, or to assign them exclusively or partly to its judicial organs, has so far
not been a matter engaging international concern. It might conceivably become such
a question however, as interest in advancing the rule of law and the protection of
fundamental human rights continues to grow. For it seems to be beyond question that
constitutionally impartial organs are better fitted to decide questions affecting individual liberties than the organs more closely geared to governmental policy.
Id.
89 Article 7 of Sweden's extradition statute is a broadly worded provision which prohibits
any extradition which is likely to result in what amounts to the persecution of the requested
person by the requesting state:
No person may be extradited who for reasons of race, membership of a certain community, religious or political opinions or otherwise on account of political circumstance runs the risk of being subjected in the foreign state to persecution which is
directed against his life or liberty or which is otherwise of a severe nature, or who does
not have any assurance there that he will not be sent to a state in which he runs such
a risk.
Article 8 states that:
Extradition may not be granted if in a specific case it is found to be obviously incom-
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patible with the requirements of humane treatment, because of the youth, health, or
any other personal circumstances of the person concerned, taking into account also the
nature of the crime and the interests of the foreign state.
Articles 7 and 8 quoted in M. WHr-MAN, supra note 78, at 886-87.
Article 8 is written almost verbatim into the Extradition Treaty between the United States
and Sweden; seeConvention on Extradition, Oct. 24, 1961, United States-Sweden, art. V, no.
6, 14 U.S.T. 1845, T.I.A.S. 5496. Thus the United States does currently have humanitarian
exceptions written into treaties to which it is a party, when it is the policy or law of the other
country to require the exception.

